In the autumn of 1958, the Middle East was in turmoil. American marines landed in Syria, and British troops were sent to Jordan at the invitation of the respective countries to prevent a Communist takeover. Mao ordered a massive bombardment in trying to seize Kinmen. To whip up the enthusiasm of the people on the mainland, the People's Daily published on October 27, 1958, an article under Mao's own signature, entitled "All Imperialists and Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers."
While Moscow failed to gobble up the Middle East, and Mao had his fingers burned on Kinmen, this article, later translated into scores of foreign languages and millions of copies of it distributed the world over in pamphlet form, became a sort of classic. It was the bible for the Chinese Communists and their North Korean, North Vietnamese, Albanian and, more recently, Cuban comrades.
But it may yet dig the grave for Mao's political career as the indisputable boss of the Chinese Communist Party.
On December 12, 1962, Nikita S. Khrushchev, in a foreign policy speech before the Supreme Soviet which lasted two hours and forty minutes, made a sharp and scarcely veiled attack on Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists, without mentioning either by name.
He charged that Albanian leaders "and the men behind them," meaning Mao and his gang, were taking "a Trotskyist position." They were sectarians, dogmatists, opportunists and adventurists. They were, Khrushchev said, like the frog which puffed itself up and tried to be like a bull. "What happened to the frog? It burst, and all that was left was a puddle."
Then came the punch aimed undoubtedly at Comrade Mao's nose. Wagging his fingers at the 1,443 delegates to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev declared that people who called imperialism a paper tiger should remember that "the paper tiger has nuclear teeth. It may still use them and it should not be treated lightly."
This statement, coming like a bomb-shell, burst the monolithic facade of international communism wide open. Thus, as 1962 bowed out and the New Year crept in, the battle over the paper tigers was on. It was, on the surface, an ideological conflict on the tactics of communizing the world. But underneath, it was a personal battle between Khrushchev and Mao, a power struggle for the leadership of the international Communist movement.
Family Squabble
When Khrushchev spoke from the podium at the Supreme Soviet, a few feet away from him sat Marshal Josip Tito, paying his first visit to Moscow since his split with the late Joseph Stalin. Outwardly, he was the cause of this "family squabble." Peiping was outraged at the sight of Moscow entering into a rapprochement with Belgrade, whom it considered "the despicable renegades of the working class, the modern revisionists. "
Considering themselves true Marxist-Leninists, the Chinese Communists have consistently attacked "Tito and his clique." In 1957, when the world's Communists gathered at Moscow to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, it was at Mao Tse-tung's insistence that the Moscow Declaration asserted that: "The main danger at present is revisionism, or, in other words, rightwing opportunism." It pointed out: "The existence of bourgeois influence is an internal source of revisionism, while surrender to imperialist pressure is its external source."
In 1960, again at the conference of Communist and workers' parties of the world, Liu Shao-chi talked them into including in the Moscow Statement this paragraph: "The modern revisionists, betraying Marxism-Leninism, carryon subversive work against the socialist camp and the world Communist movement, engage in activities which prejudice the unity of all the peace-loving forces and countries. Further exposure of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionists and active struggle to safeguard the Communist movement and the working-class movement from anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remains an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist parties."
Over the years, relations between Peiping and Belgrade were just short of the breaking point. Countless insults were exchanged by both sides. The Chinese Communist press used millions of words to vilify the Yugoslav brand of modern revisionism, calling it by every bad name they could think of. The attacks took on a new urgency after last September, when Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev paid a goodwill visit to Yugoslavia. On October 1, 1962, Peiping's "national day," Chen Yi used such violent words against Tito in a diplomatic function that Aleksander Sokorac, Yugoslav charge d'affaires, angrily walked out.
With the advent of the Cuban crisis, the Chinese Communists went wild in their denunciation of modern revisionism. Articles such as "Another Great Exposure of the Tito Group's Counter-revolutionary Features" flooded Mao's controlled press. Typical was this passage from the China Youth Daily of December 2:
Down With Revisionism
"In the opinion of the Titoites, what the revolutionary Cuban people should do in face of the frenzied U.S. attacks are to submit docilely while the people of other socialist countries should look on with folded arms at the U.S. imperialists' attempts to strangle the Cuban revolution. And whoever helps the Cuban people in their fight against aggression would be committing a heinous crime. This shows clearly that the Titoites are out-and out renegaders of the international Communist movement and faithful running dogs of U.S. imperialism."
The implication was clear. While Tito was named, the real villain was Khrushchev. In every piece of propaganda emanating from Peiping, substitute Tito for Khrushchev, modern revisionism for present Soviet policy, and the result is always closer to what is in the mind of Mao Tse-tung. Marshal Tito himself no doubt realizes this. Therefore, when he was given the unusual honor of addressing the Supreme Soviet the day following Khrushchev's paper tiger remark, all he needed to say was that the Yugoslav and Soviet views on foreign policy were "identical or close together."
Speaking in Russian, Tito heaped praise on Khrushchev's Cuban policy and said: "Unfortunately, about this policy of the Soviet government there are strange views which are dangerous insofar as they might lead certain circles to a false assessment of the motives of his wise and peace-loving step. I think it is shortsighted to consider those actions a sign of weakness."
On the other side of this name-calling game was Albania, long an outlaw among East European satellites because of Enver Hoxha's insistence on going it alone. Denounced by Khrushchev in the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in November, 1961, Albania was suspended by the Warsaw Pact, not even invited to join the Common. But for Chinese Communist support, it would have knuckled under long ago to Soviet pressure.
It was the other satellites' attack upon Albania that touched off the direct Moscow-Peiping clash. From November 6 to 16, the Bulgarian Communist Party held its 8th Congress in Sofia. Wu Hsiu-chuan, a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, known to the Western world for his appearance at the United Nations in 1950, was at the head of the Peiping delegation. On November 9, when it was his turn to address the Congress, he mildly protested against "one-sided and unreasonable attacks on the Albanian Workers Party," which he knew was meant for Peiping.
Lashing of Albania
Two weeks later, the Hungarian Communist Party was holding its 8th Congress. Wu was again representing Peiping in the Budapest meeting. The tongue lashings on Albania continued. Feeling more uneasy now, Wu told the Hungarians and assembled Red leaders from Europe: "Unfortunately, your Party Congress, by publicly and unilaterally attacking the Albanian Workers' Party, has once more repeated this practice which is destructive of the international solidarity of the proletariat. This cannot but cause us the deepest regret."
Up to then, Peiping could still pretend to be a disinterested third person. However, ten days later, when the Italian Communist Party opened its 10th Congress, 70-year-old Palmiro Togliatti tore the paper mask open and, for the first time, called the Chinese Communists to task.
"The position represented by our Chinese comrades," he declared, "which is diffused by the out-of-tone loudspeaker of the Albanian Communists, claim that war cannot be averted because this would mean that the nature of imperialism has changed and that this has not happened and cannot happen." Togliatti went on to charge that Mao and his cohorts were conducting "a smear campaign, a campaign which does not believe in a permanent peace" and this is "inadmissible, provocative and harmful." The fiery Italian also described Peiping's border conflict with India as "unreasonable and absurd."
Chao I-min, head of the Chinese Communist delegation to the Rome meeting, was stunned. Not knowing what to do, the Tass dispatch of December 2 reporting the three-hour speech deleted all mention of the Chinese Communists. Recovering later, Chao protested, but Togliatti brushed him aside. "We reject, and reject firmly, the critical remarks made by the representative of the Communist Party of China," he replied.
Meanwhile, Wu Hsiu-chuan had rough going at the 12th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. As in Rome, the satellite delegates rose one after another to denounce those "self-styled Marxists." Wu spoke on December 5. He was booed and hissed. Three days later, on the last day of the Prague conference, Wu asked Antonin Novotny, Czech first secretary, to read a statement for him complaining of "unbridled attacks on the Communist Party of China."
He pointed out that: "In this period, on the international scene, there certainly exists an anti-China chorus coming from the side of imperialism, reaction, and revisionism." He threatened darkly: "We cannot but point out that this erroneous practice has already produced serious consequences and that if continued, it is bound to produce even more serious consequences."
Like modern revisionism, Albania was also a symbol in Moscow-Peiping relations. Mao was supporting Hoxha for no other reason than that he alone of other European satellites dared to stand up against Khrushchev's bullying. Once the two became identified with each other, an attack on Albania was automatically construed to mean an attack on Peiping.
Khrushchev's Style
It was Khrushchev himself who started the fashion. As the People's Daily said on December 15: "The erroneous practice of using the congress of one party to attack another fraternal party was first resorted to a year ago at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. The CCP then resolutely opposed this erroneous practice."
Wu's statement at Prague best summed up the Chinese Communist attitude: "Some people have glibly said that the Albanian Workers' Party made charges against some comrades of a certain fraternal party, and that the Albanian comrades are to blame for the distressing situation existing today in the international Communist movement. Going further, they distort the facts and accuse the Albanian comrades of being 'anti-Soviet.'
"Why don't these people give a little thought to the question of who should be held responsible for such a situation? After all, who was first to launch an attack on the Albanian comrades? How can it be correct and permissible for one party arbitrarily to launch an attack at its own party congress against another fraternal party, while the party attacked does not have even the right to reply?
"Can it be that the launching of an attack on a fraternal party is to be called 'Marxist-Leninist' and conforms to the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, but that the reply by the attacked party is to be branded as 'sectarianism', 'splitism'. 'dogmatism,' and a violation of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement? If the replies of the Albanian comrades are to be called 'anti-Soviet,' then, may we ask, what name should be given to those who first attacked the Albanian comrades and arbitrarily leveled a whole series of charges against them?"
What the Chinese Communists wanted was to have equal say with Moscow on any and all problems. In November, 1960, the conference of 81 Communist and workers' parties of the world took three weeks to hammer out the Moscow Statement. Liu Shao-chi, who headed Peiping's delegation, held out for 14 draft changes and, it was reported, finally got what he insisted: that a high-level conference should be called to resolve any difference arising out of interpretation of the draft statement.
This was the reason that the Chinese Communists have, since then, given so much prominence to the Moscow documents. For example, the 22nd issue of the Red Flag, in an editorial entitled "Defend the Purity of Marxism-Leninism" last November, care fully pointed out: "The Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement explicitly set forth the criteria guiding the relations between the socialist countries and the relations between the Communist and workers' parties of all countries, that is, the principle of full equality, the principle of independence and brotherly mutual assistance, and the principle of settling questions of common interest through comradely consultation on an equal footing."
Point of No Return
Wu Hsiu-chuan tried to invoke this agreement at Prague. Toward the end of his statement of December 8, he revealed: "With the object of settling the differences in the international Communist movement on certain important questions of principle, the Communist Party of China and a number of other fraternal parties have proposed the convening of a meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers' parties of all countries of the world in order to clarify what is right from what is wrong, to strengthen unity, and to stand together against the enemy. We consider that this is the only correct method of settling questions. "
Direct Attack
For a little more than a day, there was the fleeting possibility that Moscow might heed this call and try to patch up relations with Peiping. Indeed, Wu's statement was hushed' up by the Chinese Communists themselves. On December 10, however, Pravda republished speeches of Palmiro Togliatti and Antonin Novotny, marking the first time that a direct attack against the Chinese Communists was printed by the official organ of the CPSU. It was a straw in the wind. Two days later, Khrushchev opened up with his paper tiger speech, dashing any hope of conciliation. On December 14, New China News Agency released Wu Hsiu-chuan's statement of six days before. The following day, the People's Daily carried a lengthy editorial entitled "Workers of All Countries Unite to Oppose Our Common Enemy." Both sides thus passed the point of no return.
Tito and Albania had been there all the time. Two recent events had irritated Khrushchev and touched off the brawl. The People's Daily editorial of December 15 gave enough insight on both issues: Cuba and India.
It acknowledged that: "Some comrades of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and comrades of certain fraternal parties accused the CCP of committing so-called 'adventurist' errors. They attacked China by alleging that it was opposed to a 'sensible compromise' on the Cuban question and wanted to 'plunge (the whole world) into a thermonuclear war.' Are things really as they claimed?"
It pointedly declared: "We are resolutely opposed to the imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail. We also hold that the socialist countries have no need whatsoever to use nuclear weapons as a gambling counter or for frightening others. To do this would be truly to commit the error of adventurism. Having blind faith in nuclear weapons and failing to recognize or have confidence in the strength of the masses of people, and to be scared out of one's wits by imperialist nuclear blackmail, would be likely to lead one to jump from one extreme to another and to commit the error of capitulationism."
Judging by any standard, capitulationism is a pretty strong word. But the editorial writer went on to throw the charges right back at Khrushchev. "If, as is alleged, China's support for the Cuban people's just struggle against the U.S. aggressors was 'adventuristic,' we would like to ask: Does this mean that the Chinese people would have to refrain from giving every possible support within their power to Cuba's struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression, in order not to be adventuristic? Does this mean only by forcing Cuba to give up its sovereignty, independence, and five just demands could one avoid being called adventurist or capitulationist? The whole world sees that we neither requested the introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba, nor obstructed the withdrawal of 'offensive weapons' from that country. For us, therefore, there is no question whatsoever of 'adventurism," still less of 'plunging (the whole world) into a thermonuclear war.'''
Mao was simply mad at Khrushchev for the latter's attitude in the Sino-Indian border dispute. The People's Daily piece had this to say: "The strange thing is that some people who claim to be Marxist-Leninists have forgotten Marxism-Leninism completely. They have never bothered to make an analysis from the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism of the Nehru government's reactionary policy of starting the Sino-Indian border conflict and all along refusing reconciliation."
It expressed disgust at the Soviet stand: "Throughout the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, they have all along confounded right and wrong, pretending to be 'neutral," calling China 'brother,' while actually regarding the Indian reactionary group as their kinsmen. Should not these people examine their own conscience, and ask themselves what has become of their Marxism-Leninism and what has become of their proletarian internationalism?"
Having dealt with Cuba and India, the official Chinese Communist organ proceeded to take Moscow directly to task. The Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement, it said, "grant no right whatsoever to any party, big or small, to launch at its own congress an attack on another fraternal party." Those who violate these guiding principles "will inevitably fall into the quagmire of big-nation chauvinism or other forms of bourgeois nationalism. "
A Communist should be merciless toward the enemy and be kindly toward his own comrades, it said, "but there are some who do just the opposite. While being so 'accommodating' and making such 'mutual concessions' with imperialism, they treat fraternal parties and fraternal countries as implacable enemies. They may make 'sensible compromises' and exercise 'moderation' in the face of the saber-rattling enemy, but refuse to be conciliatory toward fraternal parties and fraternal countries. To be so 'kindly' toward the enemy and so 'merciless' toward fraternal parties and fraternal countries is obviously not at all the stand a Marxist-Leninist should take.”
Declared the People's Daily: "We will never submit ourselves to the dictates of any anti-Marxist-Leninist bludgeon. No matter how the imperialists, the reactionaries, and the modern revisionists may abuse and oppose us, our stand in upholding Marxism-Leninism and truth is absolutely unshakable. '
The language used was so strong that Radio Moscow, without any warning, dropped its relay of Radio Peking's broadcasts ill Russian the following morning.
Wars Are Not Needed
By now the first shots were fired, the battle line drawn. On December 21, Pravda replied to the People's Daily. It asserted that the Soviet Union and her allies "reject any attacks on the principles of peaceful coexistence no matter from which quarter they come." It praised the proceedings at the congresses of European Communist parties as giving "a demonstration of unity for strengthening their ranks."
The paper edited by Khrushchev's son-in-law pointed out: "This is precisely why the Communists of all continents condemn the anti-Leninist position of the Albanian leaders and those who support them in their subversive activities, and point out that dogmatism in our days is becoming more and more a serious danger in the world Communist movement." It concluded: "Socialism and Communism do not need wars to demonstrate their superiority over capitalism."
Peiping returned with a barrage on December 31. The People's Daily editorial, "The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," was now well known to all who follow the Peiping-Moscow conflict. It was reprinted in full by the Washington Post, and summarized by many leading magazines.
The Chinese Communists hit back mercilessly at Khrushchev's remark. "Imperialism has always been armed to the teeth," it said, "and has always been out for the blood of the people. No matter what kind of teeth imperialism may have, whether guns, tanks, rocket teeth, nuclear teeth, or any other kind of teeth that modern science and technology may provide, its rotten, decadent and paper-tiger nature cannot change.
"In the final analysis, neither nuclear teeth nor any other kind of teeth can save imperialism from its fate of inevitable extinction. In the end the nuclear teeth of imperialism, and whatever other teeth it may have, will be consigned by the people of the world to the museum of history, together with imperialism itself."
The editorial's 10,000 words were largely devoted to ideological debates. Principally, it touched on these points:
* On the question of war and peace: "We have always held that as long as imperialism exists, there will be soil for wars of aggression. The danger that imperialism may start a world war still exists." "It would simply result in a phony peace or bring about an actual war for the people of the whole world if you prettify imperialism, pin your hopes of peace on imperialism, take a passive or negative attitude toward the national liberation movements and the people's revolutionary struggles, and bow down and surrender to imperialism, as advocated by those who attack the Chinese Communist Party."
* On nuclear weapons and nuclear war: "The theorists of the 'total destruction' of mankind ... have fallen into the quagmire of defeatism." "We hold that the emergence of nuclear weapons has not changed and cannot change the fundamental Marxist-Leninist theory with regard to war and peace. In reality, the numerous wars that have broken out since the appearance of nuclear weapons have all been the continuation of politics, and we still have just and unjust wars."
* On peaceful coexistence: "We hold that the question of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and the question of revolution by oppressed nations or by oppressed classes are two different kinds of questions, and not questions of the same kind." For an oppressed nation or people the question is one of waging a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the rule of imperialism and the reactionaries; it is not, and cannot be, a question of peaceful coexistence with imperialism and the reactionaries."
* On peaceful transition: "Hitherto, history has not witnessed a single example of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism." "This theory of 'structural reform' (Italian Communist suggestion that socialism could be achieved peacefully through reforms) is a complete betrayal of the Marxist-Leninist theories on proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship." Togliatti's thesis concerning the advance toward socialism in democracy and in peace "is reminiscent of some of the statements of the old revisionist, K. Kautsky."
* On whether the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism are outmoded, and whether the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement are out of date. Peiping's answer was, of course, "no."
Two articles appeared in the year's first issue of the Red Flag as a sort of cross-fire support for the People's Daily editorial. Both were given prominent display by Peiping's mass media outlets. The first, an editorial entitled "Leninism and Modern Revisionism," again running more than 10,000 words, referred clearly to Khrushchev. It even contained a veiled attack on his "personality cult." "Some people," it said, "have even set their hearts on being in the same boat with the leading personalities of the imperialist countries, and regard this as the 'greatest honor,' but do not want to be 'in the same boat' with the masses of the world. Is this not queer that such persons should have appeared in the ranks of Marxist-Leninists?"
The other, an article signed by Shao Tieh-chen, entitled "Revolutionary Dialectics and How to Appraise Imperialism," was devoted entirely to defending the paper tiger theory. '''Those who do not acknowledge that imperialism is a paper tiger are scared out of their wits by its seeming strength and hold it in awe," it charged.
Pravda again came back on January 7 with an editorial which covered two full pages and two half pages. The title, "Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement for the Triumph of Peace and Socialism," was the longest so far in this war of polemics. Compared to the Chinese Communist pieces, it was less virulent and more dignified, though equally firm in its ideological stand. The Chinese Communists were named for the first time as backers of "dogmatic, divisive views." The paper tiger thesis "is nothing but a renunciation ... of the policy of peaceful coexistence."
Radio Moscow broadcast the editorial to the world and throughout the Soviet Union, saying that it was "of immense fundamental significance." And Izvestia, the Soviet government newspaper, alleged that it had aroused "fervent approval" and "immense interest" in every Communist country.
Almost anyone becomes dizzy after reading through all the documents issued by the two sides in the current Moscow-Peiping dispute. Many have, in fact, become totally confused.
They need not be. In Communism's peculiar ways, any conflict, whether political, or cultural, always takes the form of an ideological debate. The language used is one thing, the substance another. A good Communist can be counted upon to drag Marxism-Leninism into any argument he gets into, even over a girl.
In a democracy, succession in command is an orderly thing. Totalitarianism, however, permits no such bourgeois luxury. Stalin had to be downgraded even after his death. Georgi Malenkov was charged with "anti-party" activities. This is especially true in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. From Chen Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, Chu Chiu-pai to Chang Kuo-tao, each was charged with some unforgivable sin, either "leftwing adventurism" or "rightwing opportunism," before or after they yielded control.
Paper tiger or peaceful coexistence, therefore, is not at the heart of the present quarrel between Mao and Khrushchev.
What is really at stake is Mao Tse-tung himself, his very existence as the leader of the Chinese Communists.
Since Stalin's death, the Kremlin has been slipping in its position as the absolute center of the world Communist movement. Fancying himself an elder statesman in Marxism-Leninism and therefore a contender for the throne, Mao has been too cocky to Khrushchev's liking. He may have to put up with Mao for a while, which he already has done and, as he sees it, probably for too long already.
Their ideological debate is nothing new. It has been there, off and on, since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. Khrushchev 'has tolerated Peiping and other Communist parties in deviations in domestic policies. For" example, he disagreed with the people's commune publicly, but let Mao have his way. However, he cannot possibly tolerate Mao's" challenge to his leadership in international affairs, his right to act on behalf of the Communist bloc as a whole. This is vital not only to the prestige and world position of the Soviet Union, but also to Khrushchev's own position in the Kremlin.
While he did make some miscalculations in Cuba, Khrushchev's handling of the crisis in general was, from the Soviet point of view, the best that could be hoped for under the circumstances. Peiping's criticism of "another Munich" irked him. The Indian border conflict ran contrary to his basic policy toward Afro-Asian countries, namely, to encourage neutralism and non-alignment with the West. Lastly, he does not want nuclear war, at least not for the time being. All these factors made Khrushchev do what he did in the intra-bloc crisis—lashing out at Mao Tse-tung by tearing apart the paper tiger theory.
Khrushchev is dealing from a position of strength, Since late 1961, he has cut off all military and economic aid to Peiping. He halved the volume of Soviet trade with the Chinese Communist regime, and presented the latter with a bill for Korean War-incurred debts. He did not lift a finger to help Mao to combat three successive year of bad harvests and resultant near-starvation on the Chinese mainland. By staying neutral in the Indian border war, he practically pulled the rug from under Mao's feet.
Right now he is secure in his position in the Kremlin, all "anti-party" elements such as Vladimir Molotov having been banished long ago. In the ideological debate. he has the solid support of all the European satellites save Albania, and of all Communist parties in free world countries. This support is due partly to Moscow's traditional hold over other Communist parties, and partly to the fact that men like Togliatti and Novotny have even less taste for a nuclear war than Khrushchev himself.
The split is there, not between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist regime, but between Khrushchev and Mao. Neither side has threatened to break away from the other. The January 5 editorial of the Red Flag even ended with an appeal "to hold high the banner of great friendship and unity of China and the Soviet Union." The Communists were right in never taking any great stock of the Anglo-American dispute over Skybolt or of the traditional Franco-German enmity. Conceivably, their internal quarrel will not affect the external policy of the bloc as a whole, or have any bearing on their ultimate objectives.
Militant Mao
So far, Mao Tse-tung sounds more reckless and fire-spitting in the verbal exchanges. He has reasons. He has not had assistance, financial or otherwise, from Moscow, which could not afford to anyway. If he so much as retreats one step, an avalanche will follow, The "anti-party" group headed by Peng Teh-huai and Huang Ke-cheng will be joined by others to force him to abdicate on all the charges the Kremlin has hurled at him. The communique of the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth CCP Committee of September 28, 1962, had admitted that: "This class struggle inevitably finds expression within the party. Pressure from foreign imperialism and the existence of bourgeois influences at home constitute the social source of revisionist ideas in the party. While urging a struggle against the foreign and domestic class enemies, we must remain vigilant and resolutely oppose in good time various opportunist ideological tendencies in the party."
The battle over the paper tigers will almost certainly rage on, And at the end, Mao may prove to be a paper tiger himself, losing out to the combined pressure from Khrushchev and the revisionists among the Communists' own ranks.
* * * * *
The Historical Background
February 1956—
20th Congress of CPSU
In his famous secret report, Khrushchev launched the destalinization drive by lashing out at the "personality cult." As a result, the 8th Congress of CCP in August, 1956, amended the party constitution to embody the "collective leadership" concept. It was Mao's concession to the new Kremlin boss.
October 1956—
Hungarian revolution
Coming on the heels of the Poznan riots, the Hungarian revolt shook the Communist world to its foundations. Feeling the upsurge of anti-Communist sentiments, the Chinese Communists published the well-known treatise entitled "Again on the Historical Experience of Proletariat Dictatorship." Mao ordered the "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" movement, first to smoke out discontent among intellectuals and then weed out the "poisonous grass" among them.
November 1957—
Moscow declaration
Mao personally led the Chinese Communist delegation to Moscow conference of Communist and workers' parties of the world, and the inner circle meeting of the 12 "Socialist countries." The Moscow declaration, adopted by the conference, was a compromise between Soviet and Chinese Communist views. It did say: "The main danger at present is revisionism, or, in other words, rightwing opportunism."
July-August 1958—
Middle East and Taiwan Straits crises
The "people's commune" and steel campaigns began on the Chinese mainland in this year. When world attention was focused on the Middle East following the Iraqi revolution and the landing of U.S. and UK forces in Syria and Jordan, Mao thought the time had come for him to try a little military adventure of his own. Khrushchev, paying a visit to Peiping, gave him the green light. Mao failed, however, in his attempt to take Kinmen (Quemoy), and might have blamed Khrushchev for the latter's refusal to send him better weapons.
February 1959—
21st Congress of CPSU
Khrushchev, in his report to the CPSU Congress, criticize the people's commune system. As head of the Chinese Communist delegation, Chou En-lai took the attack lying down. His consolation was a 5 billion ruble technical assistance agreement. In March there was the Tibetan uprising. And in April, Mao stepped down as head of the Peiping regime.
August 1959—
8th Plenum of CCP 8th Central Committee
While admitting serious economic difficulties and slashing production targets, Mao managed to consolidate his position within the CCP. Thereafter, he began to hit back at Khrushchev. Typical of such ideological quarrels was Mao's article in Red Flag in April, 1960, Lenin's 90th anniversary, attacking Khrushchev's theory of peaceful coexistence.
November 1960—
Moscow statement
After three weeks of closed door debates, the Moscow conference of all Communist parties adopted a statement generally endorsing peaceful coexistence while recognizing the need for "people's revolutionary wars." It was another compromise between Moscow and Peiping views which did not last for long.
January 1961—
9th Plenum of CCP 8th Central Committee
Peiping openly spoke of "three bad harvests in a row." Instead of extending a helping hand, Khrushchev suspended economic aid to the Chinese Communist regime, and asked for repayment of Korean war loans.
October 1961—
22nd Congress of CPSU
Struggle for leadership of world Communist movement came to a head in CPSU Congress. Khrushchev started the name-calling game by heaping abuse on Albania. Chou En-lai returned to Peiping before the end of the Congress as a silent protest.
June 1962—
Moscow economic conference
Peiping and Albania were excluded from this conference, which sought to establish economic cooperation among Communist countries as the Kremlin's answer to the European Common Market.
September 1962—
10th Plenum of CCP 8th Central Committee
Irritated by rapprochement between Khrushchev and Tito, the Chinese Communists voiced opposition to "great nation chauvinism" and "modern revisionism" in the communique of the 10th plenary session of the CCP 8th Central Committee.
October 1962—
Cuban crisis and Sino-Indian border war
______________________________
A Blow by Blow Account
October 20, 1962—Cuban crisis began. Peiping gave Fidel Castro strong propaganda support but was otherwise powerless to help. Indirect criticism of Soviet backdown in Cuba was slap in the face for Khrushchev and touched off current brawl.
October 21, 1962—Border conflict with India began. Soviet decision to stay neutral annoyed Peiping.
November 9, 1962-8th Congress of Bulgarian Communist Party, in which delegations from other satellite countries attacked Albania, and indirectly, the Chinese Communists. Wu Hsiu-chuan, Peiping's representative, protested mildly.
November 15, 1962—People's Daily published editorial entitled "Carry Forward the Revolutionary Spirit of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement," marking renewal of ideological quarrel.
November 16, 1962—Red Flag magazine carried one editorial, "Defend the Purity of Marxism-Leninism," and two other articles, all attacking modern revisionism.
November 21, 1962—8th Congress of Hungarian Socialist Workers' (Communist) Party. Albania again came under attack. Wu Hsiu-chuan again protested.
December 2, 1962—10th Congress of Italian Communist Party. Palmiro Togliatti, Italian Communist boss, for the first time in world Communist movement, openly attacked the Chinese Communist stand. Chao I-ming, Peiping's representative to the Congress, was taken by surprise. However, Tass deleted the offensive passages from its report.
December 4, 1962—Togliatti's attack was followed up by French and Yugoslav delegates to the Italian Congress. Chao's reply was rejected.
December 5, 1962—12th Congress of Czechoslovak Communist Party. Albania and the Chinese Communists were severely criticized. Wu Hsiu-chuan was booed and hissed by the Congress when he spoke.
December 6, 1962—World Marxist Review, official magazine of international Communism, published in Prague in 20 languages, charged that Albania and, by implication, the Chinese Communists, were demanding a "mortal blow" against Khrushchev's leadership.
December 8, 1962—At closing day of Czechoslovak Congress, Antonin Novotny, Czech first secretary, was asked by Wu Hsiu-chuan to read a statement in which Wu bitterly complained of "unbridled attacks" upon Peiping. Representing the Chinese Communist Party, Wu formally asked for "the convening of a meeting of representatives of the Communist and workers' parties of all countries of the world in order to clarify what is right from what is wrong." This story was withheld by Peiping.
December 10, 1962—Pan Tsu-li, Peiping's new "ambassador" to Moscow, arrived to take his post. As if by coincidence, Pravda republished speeches by Antonin Novotny and Palmiro Togliatti, putting back the paragraphs deleted by Tass. It marked a significant change in Soviet attitude, as the words "China" and "Chinese" were used for the first time in referring to the ideological dispute.
December 12, 1962—Khrushchev, in a foreign policy speech to the Supreme Soviet, pointedly replied to Mao by saying that the United States is a "paper tiger" with nuclear teeth. He charged that Albania "and those behind them" was taking a "Trotskyist position." He also made sly remarks on Peiping's tolerance of Hongkong and Macao.
December 13, 1962—Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister, denounced the Chinese Communists for "pseudo-revolutionary provocative phrase mongering," and said that "only those who have hidden a wall of dogmatism" opposed Khrushchev's Cuban decisions. Following him, Marshal Tito addressed also the Supreme Soviet. The target of Peiping's rage, he voiced general agreement with Khrushchev "on the question of war and peace," and referred to Peiping's attitude as "dangerous" and "short· sighted."
December 14, 1962—New China News Agency belatedly reported Wu Hsiu-chuan's statement read at the closing ceremony of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress six days ago, probably marking Peiping's decision to air differences with Moscow.
December 15, 1962—People's Daily published a 6,500-word editorial entitled "Workers of All Countries Unite to Oppose Our Common Enemy," formally declaring a war of words. Without calling Khrushchev by name, it nevertheless charged him with "capitulation ism," and vowed that "we will never submit ourselves to the dictates of any anti-Marxist-Leninist bludgeon."
December 16, 1962—Radio Moscow dropped relay of Radio Peking's broadcasts in Russian. Meanwhile, I'Humanite published a French Communist Party Central Committee resolution criticizing the Chinese Communist stand.
December 21, 1962—Pravda replied in an editorial which charged the Albanian leaders "and those who support them" with "dogmatism," which is "becoming more and more a serious danger in the world Communist movement." It said Russia would "reject any attacks on the principles of peaceful coexistence."
December 25, 1962—Chou En-lai repeated Peiping's attack on Khrushchev at a dinner honoring Outer Mongolian "Premier" Y. Tsedenbal.
December 31, 1962—People's Daily printed 10,000 word editorial entitled "The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us." It made no bones about who it meant, though it still did not mention Khrushchev by name.
January 5, 1963—Red Flag magazine, in first issue of 1963, carried another 10,000-word editorial entitled "Leninism and Modern Revisionism." Another article signed by Shao Tieh-chen, "Revolutionary Dialectics and How to Appraise Imperialism," defended Mao's paper tiger theory while hinting Khrushchev was "rightist opportunist."
January 7, 1963—Pravda, in a two-page editorial named the Chinese Communists for the first time as a backer of "dogmatic, divisive views." The reply was broadcast to the world and throughout the Soviet Union by Radio Moscow.
January 15, 1963—6th Congress of East German Communist Party. Khrushchev rejected, at least for the time being, Peiping's call for a conference of Communist parties to resolve ideological differences.